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Too little, too late? The Home Office and
the Asbestos Industry Regulations, 1931:
A Reply
MORRIS GREENBERG and NICK WIKELEY*
Peter Bartrip's article in this journal, 'Too little, too late? The Home Office and the
Asbestos Industry Regulations, 1931',I argues that "hitherto studies ofthe early history of
asbestos and occupational health have been dominated by that most beguiling, though
misleading, of distractions: hindsight".2 In doing so, he seeks to challenge what he
describes as "the prevailing consensus" amongst scholars. The work of Greenberg3 and
Wikeley4 is subjected to particular scrutiny; we are therefore grateful to the editors of
Medical History for the opportunity to respond to these criticisms. However, the space
constraints of a note are such that we can highlight only some of the main weaknesses in
Bartrip's analysis and conclusions.
First, Bartrip contends that "there are no convincing grounds for the argument that the
regulations were established tardily".5 It is undoubtedly true that the Factory Department
moved relatively swiftly from the publication of the Merewether and Price report6to the
promulgation of regulations.7 But Greenberg's article-in a rigorous peer-reviewed
academicjournal8-reviews a substantial body ofwork published in England, France and
America between 1898 and 1928, available to all the interested parties during that period,
which drew attention to the potential dangers associated with asbestos exposure.
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Secondly, Bartrip concludes that there is little evidence to support the interpretation that
the regulators were one-sided in their approach.9 This is something of a caricature of the
argument advanced in the article by Wikeley,'0 in which the drafting of the regulations is
considered in a broader context. Bartrip's paper is singularly deficient in terms of its
discussion ofthe regulations themselves, as opposed to the process leading up to them. He
neglects to describe either how the regulations created "scheduled areas", beyond which
the framework of the 1931 provisions on dust control, medical examinations and
compensation was largely inapplicable, or the scope of the exemptions."l
Thirdly, we are told that there is no evidence to suggest that the manufacturers were
reluctant to introduce dust control measures.12 Wikeley's earlier work was published
before scholars had obtained, as a by-product of litigation in the American courts, access
to a micro-filmed selection of documents from the Turner & Newall archive.13 These
documents support the view that the company was concerned throughout to limit the
scope ofregulatory control. 14Bartrip's depiction ofthe company willingly shouldering the
burden ofregulation also fails to address the long history ofits concealment ofthe dangers
associated with asbestos, both in the United Kingdom and overseas.15 This extended to
arrangements for medical examinations: in 1932, Turner & Newall director Robert Turner
intimated to a fellow industrialist: "I am in complete agreement with your suggestion that
we should endeavour to have the asbestos industry removed from the schedule of
dangerous occupations".16The endorsement ofthe regulations by Legge, then a sick man,
on behalfofthe TUC should be seen in the context ofwarnings he received that asbestosis
affected those outside the scheme and also that asbestos might cause cancer.17
Fourthly, and most remarkably, Bartrip claims that "there is clear statistical evidence that
the asbestosis mortality rate declined in the years following implementation of the
regulations".'8The reality is thatthe official statistics seriously under-recorded the incidence
of asbestos-related mortality.'9 Bartrip also entirely fails to take account of the latency
factor: his comparison of data for 1931 and 1957 is meaningless. Peto and his colleagues
have shown how the soaring curve for mesothelioma deaths matches the rising tonnage
figures, albeit separated by a latency period ofthirty years or more.20The evidence suggests
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not so much that the Factory Inspectorate was satisfied with the performance ofthe asbestos
industry in complying with the 1931 regulations2' but rather that its own enforcement of
those rules was woefully deficient. For example, there was a long history offailures in dust
control measures at J W Roberts, a wholly-owned subsidiary ofTurner & Newall,22 and at
the Hebden Bridge factory ofits chiefdomestic competitor, Cape Asbestos Co. Ltd.23
Moreover, if asbestos was not seen as uniquely dangerous, why did the 1931 Regulations
require that even for some ancillary jobs more than eight hours' exposure to asbestos in a
week was sufficient to bring workers within the scope of the dust control and medical
scheme?24And, ifit was so unexceptional, why were the regulations enacted so swiftly after
the Merewether and Price report, as against the delays in dealing with the causes of other
occupational diseases? The wider context must include consideration ofthe complete failure
by government for many years thereafter to tackle the dangers associated with asbestos
spraying, first identified by Donald Hunter in the early 1930s, as well as the industrial and
military demand for asbestos as a cheap and effective insulation material. It is also entirely
erroneous to suggest, as Bartrip does, that the asbestos industry is "virtually extinct";25 the
current debate on a ban on asbestos in the European Union is a matterofintense controversy
with theCanadian government, which ispursuing the matterintheWorldTradeOrganisation.
Ultimately, the reality is that if there were any substance and merit to Bartrip's
arguments, then they would have been deployed by the asbestos industry to defend itself.
Over the last decade or more, considerable sums have been paid out by asbestos
companies or their insurers in damages, resulting in substantial losses on the Lloyd's
market. This would not have happened ifthe asbestos companies had not been negligent.
Even in 1950, Turner & Newall appreciated that it had no realistic defence to claims based
on breaches of statutory duty under the 1931 Regulations.26In 1995, the accumulated
evidence presented by Chase Manhattan Bank in the New York District Court was so
damning that the Turner & Newall defence team did not even seek to contest the
company's past failures in dust control (and instead directed their attack, successfully in
the event, against Chase's own actions and reputation).27 The 1931 Regulations, whatever
their manifold deficiencies, set out a series oflegal requirements to prevent "the escape of
asbestos dust into the airofany room in which persons work". It is the authors' contention
that it was industry's failure to meet those rules which has been the source ofits problems
rather than, as Bartrip claims, the work of scholars who have allegedly exaggerated the
asbestos hazard retrospectively with "beguiling hindsight".
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investigation: Case No. C.253/V, Parliamentary Soc., 1997, 24: 252-75.
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